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Internet Pharmacies and the Specter of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause 
Laura Vanderstappen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Americans today face a health care crisis of monumental 
proportions. Health care costs, particularly costs of prescription 
medications, are increasing at an alarming rate.1 At the same time, 
however, estimates suggest that more than 18% of Americans, a total 
of nearly forty-five million individuals, lack health insurance of any 
kind and thus suffer an almost complete denial of access to health 
care.2 An even larger percentage of Americans are significantly 
underinsured and similarly experience problems of access to health 
care.3  
 
 * J.D. (2006), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law; B.A. (2001), 
University of Urbana-Champaign.  The author would like to thank Bonny Range and Mike 
Vanderstappen for their love and support. 
 1. According to recent estimates, health care spending accounts for nearly 15% of the 
nation’s economy. Robert Pear, Health Spending Rises to 15% of Economy, Record Level, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at A16. In 2002 alone spending increased by 9.3%, reaching a total of 
$1.55 trillion. Id. Spending on prescription drugs in particular has contributed to much of the 
overall increase. Id. 
 2. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER 1 
(2006), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/7216.cfm. Medicare, Medicaid, and similar 
programs have been instrumental in guaranteeing that millions of elderly and low-income 
individuals receive health care coverage. Id. However, despite these gains, there remains a 
significant and undeniable gap in coverage that primarily affects “working families with low 
and moderate incomes, families for whom coverage is not available in the workplace or is 
unaffordable.” Id.  
 3. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, UNDERINSURED IN 
AMERICA: IS HEALTH COVERAGE ADEQUATE? 1 (2002), available at http://www.kkf.org/ 
uninsured/4060-index.cfm. This report describes the underinsured as individuals who “have 
health insurance but face significant cost sharing or limits on benefits that may affect its 
usefulness in accessing or paying for needed health services.” Id. Approximately 38% of 
insured individuals surveyed in 2002 reported access problems, id. at 1–2, and thus may be 
described as underinsured. 
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In response to these problems, Americans have begun to seek out 
cheaper and more convenient methods of acquiring health services 
and prescription medications. The Internet has provided a partial 
answer with the birth of “e-health.” E-health broadly refers to any 
mode of technologically mediated health care.4 With the rise of e-
health, Americans increasingly rely on Internet services to obtain 
health-related information, speak with a physician, obtain a 
prescription, and even have the prescription filled without the 
discomfort, inconvenience, and expense associated with traditional 
methods of health care delivery.5 Internet pharmacies in particular 
have proliferated as a viable solution to the current health care crisis.6 
Although Internet pharmacies may provide a beneficial solution, they 
also pose substantial risks to health and welfare.7 
Individual states and the federal government have struggled to 
adopt a successful regulatory framework to address the significant 
problems posed by Internet pharmacies. Under the current 
framework, regulation of prescription medications, the prescribing 
physicians, and the dispensing pharmacists is divided between the 
federal government and individual states.8 Further, states themselves 
have adopted various regulatory approaches aimed at restricting or 
controlling the activities of Internet pharmacies.9 However, such state 
 
 4. Nicolas P. Terry, Prescriptions sans Frontieres (or How I Stopped Worrying About 
Viagra on the Web But Grew Concerned About the Future of Healthcare Delivery), 4 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 183, 186 (2004). The term “e-health” encompasses various 
methods of technologically mediated health care, including “Internet-based prescribing and 
dispensing, e-prescribing, health advice websites, online continuing medical education and 
health care procurement.” Id. (citations omitted). The term “telemedicine” can be used 
interchangeably with the term “e-health.” However, as Terry points out, telemedicine initially 
referred more narrowly to “a consultation-based model of diagnosis and . . . treatment” in which 
a “primary . . . physician uses technology . . . to connect to a consulting . . . physician . . . .” Id. 
at 185. As such, it is conceptually more accurate to distinguish between these two terms. 
 5. Id. at 186–87. 
 6. Commentators suggest that Internet pharmacies represent “the fastest growing 
segment of the pharmacy industry.” Id. at 188. 
 7. Linda C. Fentiman, Internet Pharmacies and the Need for a New Federalism: 
Protecting Consumers While Increasing Access to Prescription Drugs, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 
119, 125–26 (2003). Fentiman notes that “Internet pharmacies . . . pose substantial risk to 
individual and public health, since their operations in the ‘wild west’ of cyberspace are largely 
out of reach of federal and state regulators, for both legal and technological reasons.” Id. at 123 
(citations omitted). 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part III.B. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/28
p619 Vanderstappen book pages.doc  12/4/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006] Internet Pharmacies & the Dormant Commerce Clause 621 
 
 
regulations raise significant concerns under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause,10 which acts as a limitation on state regulatory authority.11 
Courts have disagreed on whether analogous regulations of Internet 
activity operate in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.12 
Most controversially, some courts have taken the position that all 
state regulations of Internet activity will fail because this area falls 
under the sole authority of the federal government.13  
This Note argues that the Dormant Commerce Clause does not 
necessarily foreclose a state’s ability to regulate Internet pharmacies, 
but that the state should keep this restriction in mind in adopting such 
regulations. Part II presents a brief overview of the phenomenon of 
Internet pharmacies, including the types of Internet pharmacies and 
the advantages and disadvantages that they present. Part III describes 
the current federal and state regulatory framework and presents 
several representative state regulatory responses to Internet 
pharmacies. Part IV presents an overview of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause and reviews a split of authority as to whether state regulations 
of the Internet represent a per se violation of this provision. Part V 
rejects at the outset a bright-line ban on all state regulations of 
Internet pharmacies and analyzes the validity of several 
representative state regulations under current Dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.  
II. OVERVIEW OF INTERNET PHARMACIES  
A. Types of Internet Pharmacies 
There are two general types of Internet pharmacies: first, 
legitimate pharmacies that operate as an online version of traditional 
pharmacies; and second, illegitimate “rogue” pharmacies.14 The first 
 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See infra Part IV.A. 
 12. See infra Part IV.B. 
 13. See infra notes 88, 90 and 92. 
 14. Fentiman, supra note 7, at 126. However, debate exists as to the number of 
“categories” of Internet pharmacies. For example, one commentator has suggested that there are 
four categories of online pharmacies: “‘[1] online pharmacies that are partners with traditional 
brick and mortar pharmacies . . .; [2] online pharmacies that are themselves brick and mortar 
pharmacies . . .; [3] online pharmacies that operate solely on the Internet . . .; and [4] websites 
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type of online pharmacy is exactly like a traditional pharmacy, except 
that it operates online.15 These pharmacies play a solely distributive 
role.16 Customers of these legitimate pharmacies typically deliver a 
valid physician prescription to the online pharmacist, who then sends 
the filled prescription to the customer.17  
The second type of Internet pharmacy is commonly known as a 
“rogue” pharmacy.18 These pharmacies often concentrate on 
providing a select group of prescription drugs, such as Viagra or 
Prozac, to a target population.19 Unlike legitimate online pharmacies, 
rogue pharmacies often do not require a prior examination or valid 
physician prescription to dispense the desired medications to the 
customer.20 Instead, many rogue pharmacies simply require the 
customer to fill out an online questionnaire demonstrating his or her 
medical need for the desired medication.21 Although these 
questionnaires are supposedly evaluated by a physician or 
pharmacist, it has become glaringly obvious that this screening 
procedure is a farce and that virtually anyone can easily obtain 
prescription medications from rogue pharmacies with little effort.22  
 
. . . where consumers can order prescription drugs without a prescription . . . .’” Ivette P. 
Gomez, Note, Beyond the Neighborhood Drugstore: U.S. Regulation of Online Prescription 
Drug Sales by Foreign Businesses, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 431, 433 (2002) 
(quoting Amy J. Oliver, Internet Pharmacies: Regulation of a Growing Industry, 28 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 98, 98 (2000)). Although perhaps it is more accurate to divide the types of online 
pharmacies more narrowly, for purposes of this Note it is sufficient to broadly characterize 
online pharmacies as either traditional legitimate ventures or illegitimate “rogue” pharmacies. 
 15. Fentiman, supra note 7, at 126. An example of this type of pharmacy is 
drugstore.com. Id. 
 16. Terry, supra note 4, at 188 (noting that such legitimate Internet pharmacies “do not 
offer prescribing services but fill prescriptions that, while frequently electronically transmitted, 
are written by a traditional healthcare provider”). 
 17. Fentiman, supra note 7, at 126. Customers may deliver valid prescriptions by mail or 
by fax, id., or the prescribing physician may deliver the prescriptions to the online pharmacy by 
phone, Gomez, supra note 14, at 431. These pharmacies will not supply medication to the 
customer without a valid prescription obtained by a licensed physician, and they will often 
verify submitted prescriptions with the prescribing physician before the prescriptions are filled 
and sent to the customer. Id. 
 18. Fentiman, supra note 7, at 126. 
 19. Id. at 127. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. Fentiman notes that “[a]lthough this process is designed ostensibly to ensure that 
no patient receives . . . prescription drug[s] in cases in which it is not medically appropriate, in 
many cases it appears that this online ‘consultation’ is a charade, and that virtually anyone can 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/28
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B. Advantages and Disadvantages of Internet Pharmacies 
Internet pharmacies clearly offer significant advantages to the 
average consumer.23 First, by allowing consumers to submit 
prescriptions and receive medications electronically and through the 
mail, these pharmacies may provide a viable solution to the access to 
health care problem.24 Similarly, Internet pharmacies allow 
consumers to save time and avoid inconvenience by not having to 
make a trip to a local pharmacy and wait on site for a prescription to 
be filled.25 Internet pharmacies may also allow consumers to maintain 
a sense of privacy and avoid the potential embarrassment of picking 
up certain medications in person from a local pharmacy.26 Finally, 
many Internet pharmacies offer medications at a reduced cost, 
thereby offering consumers a cost-effective alternative to the soaring 
costs of health care.27 
Despite these advantages, Internet pharmacies, particularly rogue 
pharmacies, pose serious concerns that highlight the need for 
 
purchase . . . [these] drug[s] online.” Id. For example, some online questionnaires contain pre-
checked “correct” answers, such that “only consumers who are supremely honest or extremely 
stupid will fail to receive the desired medication.” Id. at 127–28. Further, there have been 
several notable instances in which individuals have obtained prescription medications from 
rogue pharmacies despite the fact that a cursory evaluation of the submitted questionnaires 
would have clearly shown the inappropriateness of such medications for these individuals. For 
example, an investigative journalist testified at a congressional hearing that he obtained Viagra 
after entering the actual height and weight of his cat in an online questionnaire. Ty Clevenger, 
Internet Pharmacies: Cyberspace Versus the Regulatory State, 15 J.L. & HEALTH 165, 165 
(2001). As a result, the American Medical Association has criticized the use of such online 
questionnaires. See infra note 55.  
 23. See Fentiman, supra note 7; see also A Prescription for Safety: The Need for H.R. 
3880, The Internet Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act, 108th Cong. 23–39 (2004) (statement 
of William K. Hubbard, Associate Commissioner for Policy & Planning) [hereinafter Hubbard 
Statement], available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2004/internetdrugs0318.html. 
 24. Fentiman, supra note 7, at 126 (“Internet pharmacies . . . have the potential to increase 
access to health care, particularly for consumers for whom transportation or communication is 
otherwise difficult, expensive, or painful.”); see also Hubbard Statement, supra note 23, at 27 
(noting that Internet pharmacies provide “[a]ccess to drugs for the disabled or otherwise 
homebound, for whom a trip to the pharmacy can be difficult”).  
 25. Fentiman, supra note 7, at 129; see also Hubbard Statement, supra note 23, at 27 
(noting that Internet pharmacies provide the convenience of twenty-four-hour-a-day shopping). 
 26. Fentiman, supra note 7, at 129; see also Hubbard Statement, supra note 23, at 27 
(suggesting that Internet pharmacies ensure “[p]rivacy for those who don’t want to discuss their 
medical needs in a public place”). 
 27. See Fentiman, supra note 7, at 129. 
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effective regulation.28 Most importantly, Internet pharmacies may 
pose an increased risk to public health by providing unsafe and 
dangerous prescription medications.29 This concern is exacerbated by 
the fact that many Internet pharmacies are based in foreign 
countries.30 These foreign medications are subject to the 
manufacturing and dispensing standards of the producing country, 
which are often less rigorous than those of the United States.31  
A related concern is the potential for fraud.32 Internet pharmacies 
may engage in fraud by failing to deliver purchased medications to 
the consumer.33 Internet pharmacies may alternatively engage in 
fraud by intentionally supplying counterfeit or otherwise improper 
medications to consumers.34 Fraud of this kind may subject a 
pharmacy to various criminal and civil prosecutions; however, such 
prosecutions often face numerous practical difficulties.35 
 
 28. See Hubbard Statement, supra note 23. Hubbard notes that “[w]hile Internet sites 
operated by legitimate, properly licensed pharmacies provide genuine benefits to consumers, 
sites that are unlicensed or otherwise engaged in the illegal dispensing of prescription drugs 
pose a serious potential threat to the health and safety of American citizens.” Id. at 27–28; see 
also Fentiman, supra note 7, at 129–30. 
 29. Fentiman, supra note 7, at 129; see also Hubbard Statement, supra note 23, at 28 
(indicating that Internet pharmacies pose risks to consumers such as “potential side effects from 
inappropriately prescribed medications, dangerous drug interactions or drug contamination,” 
and that consumers “may unknowingly buy counterfeit copies that contain inert ingredients, 
legitimate drugs that are outdated and have been diverted to illegitimate resellers, or dangerous 
sub-potent or super-potent products that were improperly manufactured”). 
 30. Gomez, supra note 14, at 434 (indicating that “[a] survey of more than 2,000 online 
pharmacy services conducted in the year 2000 revealed that eighteen percent were based 
internationally”). 
 31. Fentiman, supra note 7, at 130. 
 32. Id. at 132. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. (noting that fraud may result when a pharmacy delivers medications that are 
“counterfeit, adulterated, ineffective, or super-potent”). 
 35. Id. For example, state attorneys general may attempt to bring civil actions against 
illegitimate Internet pharmacies alleging violation of consumer protection statutes and seeking 
injunctive relief. Id. at 152–53. In addition, private consumers may bring civil actions against 
Internet pharmacies alleging various tort or contract claims. Id. at 154. However, in civil actions 
such as these, “the practical problems of physically locating an Internet prescriber or 
pharmacist, as well as jurisdictional hurdles, may inhibit the bringing of suit.” Id. These civil 
actions have also been criticized on the grounds that “the time and expense of investigating and 
prosecuting these cases . . . leave them with an inadequate response to illegitimate Internet 
prescribing and dispensing.” Id. at 153. 
 In addition to civil actions, illegitimate pharmacies may be subject to criminal prosecutions 
alleging such crimes as “wire and mail fraud, and, therefore, RICO [Racketeer Influenced and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/28
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A final concern is the lack of medical oversight that often 
characterizes Internet pharmacies.36 Consumers are often able to 
obtain prescription medications from Internet pharmacies without a 
physician examination.37 As a result, Internet pharmacies increase the 
risk that consumers will practice self-diagnosis in choosing particular 
medications.38 However, these self-diagnosed medications may, in 
reality, be ineffective for the particular patient or may pose a 
potential risk of complications of which the patient is unaware but 
that could be detected by a trained physician.39  
III. CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The current regulatory framework concerning Internet pharmacies 
is a complicated mixture of both federal and state regulations.40 
Federal regulations focus primarily on the manufacture, sale, and 
distribution of pharmaceuticals,41 while state regulations focus 
primarily on the licensing of pharmacists and prescribing 
physicians.42 This “interlocking trellis”43 of regulations poses 
numerous difficulties in ascertaining the proper realm of regulatory 
 
Corrupt Organizations Act] violations.” Id. at 132. Although perhaps less onerous, such 
criminal prosecutions face similar jurisdictional and practical enforcement hurdles to those 
mentioned above. See id. at 163–65. For a more detailed discussion of civil and criminal 
jurisdictional and practical enforcement obstacles, see Fentiman, supra note 7.  
 36. Fentiman, supra note 7, at 130; see also Hubbard Statement, supra note 23, at 29. 
 37. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 38. Fentiman, supra note 7, at 130 (noting that Internet pharmacies pose a “significant 
risk that a patient will essentially engage in self-diagnosis and choose a drug believed necessary 
for treatment, without benefit of the clinical judgment and expertise that a patient relies on in 
the usual physician-patient encounter”). 
 39. Hubbard Statement, supra note 23, at 28. In such situations, “the risk of negative 
outcomes such as harmful drug interactions, contraindications, allergic reactions or improper 
dosing is potentially magnified.” Id. The concerns posed by self-diagnosis are particularly 
problematic when the “patient may be using a prescription drug for the first time or where the 
patient may be taking other medications.” Id. 
 40. See Patricia Stolfi, Comment, Caveat Emptor: Regulating the On-Line Medicine Man 
in the New Frontier, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 377, 380–86 (2000); see also 
Clevenger, supra note 22. See generally Fentiman, supra note 7 (containing an overview of the 
current state and federal regulatory framework regarding pharmacies generally and Internet 
pharmacies more specifically).  
 41. See infra Part III.A. 
 42. See infra Part III.B. 
 43. Clevenger, supra note 22, at 173 (quoting the description by the Iowa Supreme Court 
in State v. Rasmussen, 213 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 1973)). 
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authority for the state and federal governments, as well as in 
successfully applying and enforcing both sets of regulations. 
A. Federal Regulations 
The primary federal regulation that governs prescription 
pharmaceuticals is the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA or “the 
Act”).44 Several federal agencies are responsible for enforcing the 
provisions of the FDCA,45 the most dominant of which is the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA).46 The FDCA contains requirements 
for manufacturers and distributors (including prescribing physicians) 
as to packaging, labeling, and distributing pharmaceuticals.47 The 
FDCA also dictates the approval process for distributing new 
pharmaceuticals within the United States.48 The Act further imposes 
detailed registration requirements that manufacturers must follow.49 
Finally, the FDCA prohibits the sale or distribution of adulterated or 
misbranded drugs.50 Manufacturers and distributors must comply 
 
 44. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–397 (2000).  
 45. In addition to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), other agencies that aid in 
regulating pharmaceuticals include the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Customs Service, and the Postal Service. See 
Fentiman, supra note 7, at 133.  
 46. The establishment of the FDA and the enumeration of its mission and regulatory 
authority can be found in the FDCA itself. 21 U.S.C. § 393. Under the FDCA, the mission of 
the FDA is to “protect the public health by ensuring that . . . human . . . drugs are safe and 
effective [and that] there is reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of devices 
intended for human use.” Id. § 393(b)(2)(B)-(C). The United States Supreme Court has 
approved FDA regulatory oversight of pharmaceuticals. See United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 
689 (1948).  
 47. See 21 U.S.C. § 352. The FDCA also regulates physician distribution of certain 
categories of drugs. Id. § 353(b). The Act provides that selected categories of drugs shall only 
be prescribed under certain circumstances and by specified individuals. Id. The Act further 
provides that drugs falling into the following category are subject to these requirements: “(1) 
A[ny] drug intended for use by man which . . . because of its toxicity or other potentiality for 
harmful effect . . . is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by 
law to administer such drug; . . . .” Id. § 353(b)(1). Drugs subject to the requirements of this 
section are exempt from specified labeling and packaging requirements of section 352. Id. 
§ 353(b)(2). 
 48. Id. § 355. 
 49. Id. § 360. 
 50. See id. §§ 351–352 (defining when a drug is considered adulterated or misbranded, 
respectively). 
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with all of the FDCA’s requirements to legally operate within the 
United States.51 
B. State Regulations 
Traditionally, a state may regulate matters that fall under its police 
power authority, which encompasses all matters that concern the 
health or welfare of its citizens.52 This includes authority over certain 
aspects of physician and pharmacist practice despite the FDA’s broad 
regulatory authority over the sale, distribution, and manufacture of 
pharmaceuticals. In particular, states remain wholly responsible for 
regulating, monitoring, and licensing prescribing physicians and 
individual pharmacists.53  
 
 51. Although the FDCA maintains strict requirements as to who may manufacture or 
distribute pharmaceuticals and under what circumstances, the regulatory oversight of the Act is 
not without potential flaw. For example, the FDCA contains an exception allowing the 
importation of unapproved drugs for use by an individual under certain circumstances. Id. 
§ 360bbb(b). Under this exception, the FDA allows patients, under the supervision of a licensed 
physician, to import a limited supply of unapproved investigational pharmaceuticals. Id. The 
treating physician must certify that there is no approved alternative treatment available, that 
there is sufficient evidence as to the safety of the proposed medication, and that he or she will 
supervise the patient’s use of the imported drug. Id. 
 It has been argued that the FDA’s importation policy should be extended to allow for the 
importation of cheaper drugs from other countries such as Canada or Mexico, especially given 
the fact that the FDA has tended to turn a blind eye toward importation. See generally Helkei 
Tinsley, Current Public Law and Policy Issues—Prescriptions Without Borders: America 
Looks to Canada for Answers to Solve the Prescription Drug Pricing Predicament in the U.S., 
But is Importation Really the Solution?, 25 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 437 (2004). However, 
as Tinsley notes, “[t]his policy . . . is limited to importing unapproved drugs. It was never 
intended to allow the reimportation of cheaper versions of FDA approved drugs.” Id. at 461. 
 52. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). The Supreme Court 
stated that “[i]t cannot be denied that the power of a State to protect the lives, health, and 
property of its citizens, and to preserve good order and the public morals . . . is a power 
originally and always belonging to the States . . . .” Id. at 11. The Court further stressed that it is 
essential to protect the “independence of the commercial power and of the police power” in 
order to preserve the “autonomy of the States as required by our dual form of government.” Id. 
at 13.  
 53. See Stolfi, supra note 40, at 383 (noting that “the FDA has never obtained any 
regulatory control over the licensure of pharmacists or doctors,” and that “[t]hroughout the 
entire regulatory debate these responsibilities remained with the states”); see also Fentiman, 
supra note 7, at 145–52. As Fentiman notes, “[t]he current regulatory system relies on 
physician oversight as an essential aspect of ensuring that drugs are safely and appropriately 
prescribed.” Id. at 146. Thus, without effective state regulations that ensure the integrity of 
physicians and pharmacists, federal regulations aimed at pharmaceutical sale and distribution 
would be largely meaningless.  
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p619 Vanderstappen book pages.doc  12/4/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
628 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 22:619 
 
 
States have pursued various regulatory approaches in response to 
the concerns raised by the growing proliferation of Internet medicine 
and Internet pharmacies. For example, with the rise of e-health, many 
have voiced concerns regarding the ease with which patients can 
obtain a prescription online without ever setting foot in a doctor’s 
office.54 In response to these concerns, many states have adopted 
policies regulating the circumstances under which physicians may 
prescribe or distribute prescription medications online.55  
More specifically, with regard to the phenomenon of Internet 
pharmacies, states have likewise taken various approaches.56 Several 
states have adopted strict statutes forbidding or severely restricting 
any pharmacist from dispensing pharmaceuticals via the Internet.57 
For example, a California statute prohibits any person (whether in-
 
 54. See Fentiman, supra note 7, at 146–47. Internet pharmacies that allow patients to 
obtain prescriptions simply by filling out an online questionnaire undercut the ability of the 
physician to provide meaningful oversight. Id. These websites are particularly problematic 
“because the ‘correct’ answers may be pre-checked . . . [and] there is no way for an online 
physician to verify the patient’s vital signs, symptoms, and overall medical condition to 
ascertain if the medication which is sought should be prescribed.” Id. at 146–47 (footnote 
omitted). 
 55. Id. at 147–48. These policies were adopted largely in response to the 
recommendations of the Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States. Id. The 
Federation has urged that physicians who prescribe medication to patients without conducting a 
full physical examination and history evaluation “clearly fail[] to meet an acceptable standard 
of care and [are] outside the bounds of professional conduct.” FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS. OF 
THE U.S., INC., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 
8 (2000), available at http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/2000_grpol_professional_conducts_and_ 
ethics.pdf. The American Medical Association has also stressed that online prescribing should 
be limited to only those circumstances in which a valid physician-patient relationship exists. 
AM. MED. ASSOC., REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 7-A-03 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/upload/mm/annual03/bot7a03.doc. Several states have adopted 
regulations in response to these recommendations. For a complete list, see Fentiman, supra note 
7, at 148 n.144. 
 Many states have taken disciplinary action against physicians who have practiced Internet 
prescribing. These proceedings have commenced either under the above-mentioned regulations 
or under long-standing laws requiring physician licensing in a particular state prior to 
prescribing medications to in-state patients. Id. at 148–49. However, because such online 
prescribers are often located out of state, “such [proceedings] are extremely difficult and 
resource-intensive, as each state must track down the out-of-state physician . . . and then initiate 
disciplinary proceedings” in cooperation with the physician’s state of residence. Id. at 149. 
 56. Id. at 150. This Note will only examine a representative few of these regulatory 
approaches. For a more comprehensive discussion of the various state approaches to the 
regulation of Internet pharmacies, see id. at 149–52. 
 57. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4067 (West 2003). 
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state or out-of-state) from dispensing prescription drugs via the 
Internet to residents of California except when prescribed pursuant to 
a good faith physical examination.58 This statute limits the 
circumstances under which an Internet pharmacist may dispense 
prescription medications. It also makes enforcement less difficult by 
requiring that the dispensing pharmacist inquire as to a prior 
examination.59 
Other states have taken a slightly less strict approach, permitting 
Internet pharmacies to dispense medications so long as they are 
licensed and certified by the state’s board of pharmacy.60 For 
example, a Nevada statute prohibits any illegal Internet pharmacy 
(whether in-state or out-of-state) from filling or dispensing a 
prescription to any Nevada resident.61 The statute defines “illegal 
Internet pharmacy” as any pharmacy that is not licensed and certified 
pursuant to Nevada regulations.62 These two provisions read together 
establish that any pharmacist may fill or dispense medications via the 
Internet so long as he or she is properly licensed to do so by the state 
of Nevada. 
 
 58. Id. The statute provides in relevant part: 
No person or entity shall dispense or furnish, or cause to be dispensed or furnished, 
dangerous drugs or dangerous devices . . . on the Internet for delivery to any person in 
this state without a prescription issued pursuant to a good faith prior examination if the 
person or entity either knew or reasonably should have known that the prescription 
was not issued pursuant to a good faith prior examination . . . . 
Id. § 4067(a). 
 59. Id.; see also Fentiman, supra note 7, at 150. The language of the California statute 
“effectively establish[es] a duty to inquire about the nature of the physician-patient relationship 
that led to the prescription.” Id. By doing so, the statute “makes it much easier for prosecutors 
and/or state licensing boards to succeed in reining in Internet pharmacies.” Id. 
 60. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.3638 (2005). 
 61. The statute also prohibits any illegal pharmacy located in the state of Nevada from 
filling or delivering medication to anyone who is a resident of any other state. Id. 
§ 453.3638(1)–(2) (prohibiting any illegal pharmacy—located either within the state of Nevada 
or within any other state—from “fill[ing] or refill[ing] a prescription for a prescription drug for 
another person located within or outside this State; or . . . [d]eliver[ing] or caus[ing], allow[ing] 
or aid[ing] in the delivery of a controlled substance, imitation controlled substance, counterfeit 
substance or prescription drug to another person located within or outside this State”). 
 62. Id. § 453.3618 (defining an illegal Internet pharmacist as “a person located within or 
outside this State who is not licensed and certified by the board pursuant to [state regulation] to 
engage in the practice of pharmacy via the Internet . . . .”). 
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Finally, several other states have enacted statues that prohibit out-
of-state Internet pharmacists from dispensing medication to residents 
in the state unless they are validly licensed in their home state and 
follow other statutory requirements.63 For example, a New York 
statute requires inter alia that all nonresident pharmacists be licensed 
and in good standing in their state of residence, maintain available 
records of all shipments to the state of New York, and provide a toll-
free telephone number at which the pharmacist can be reached.64 
States that adopt this approach generally defer to the home state of 
the nonresident pharmacy to bring disciplinary actions.65  
IV. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
A. Background and Analytical Framework 
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the 
power to regulate interstate commerce.66 Although the Constitution is 
 
 63. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 63.8 (2003). The New York statute 
applies generally to all nonresident pharmacies that “ship[], mail[], or deliver[] prescription 
drugs or devices to other establishments, authorized prescribers and/or patients residing in New 
York State.” Id. § 63.8(a)(1). However, the statue also specifically provides that “[s]uch 
establishments shall include . . . pharmacies that transact business through the use of the 
internet.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. § 63.8(b)(5)-(6). More specifically, the statute provides: 
(5) In order to be registered, nonresident establishments shall: (i) be licensed and/or 
registered in good standing with the state of residence; (ii) maintain, in readily 
retrievable form, records of drugs and/or devices shipped into New York State; . . . (iv) 
comply with all statutory and regulatory requirements of the state where the 
nonresident establishment is located . . .; (6) (i) . . . provide a toll-free telephone 
number that is available during normal business hours at least 40 hours per week . . . . 
Id. 
 65. This assertion is supported by the above-quoted language requiring that all 
nonresident pharmacists comply with the statutory and regulatory requirements of their home 
state. Id. § 63.8(b)(5)(iv). As such, it can be assumed that the home state would similarly be 
responsible for commencing disciplinary or enforcement action against the pharmacy at issue. 
However, the statute more specifically notes that “for controlled substances shipped, mailed, or 
delivered into New York State, the nonresident pharmacy shall follow Federal law and New 
York State law.” Id. This suggests that New York may commence disciplinary action against a 
nonresident pharmacist if the incident involves the distribution of controlled substances rather 
than prescription medication. However, the specific language of this provision in whole is 
somewhat ambiguous and does not specifically address New York’s authority regarding 
disciplinary actions against nonresident pharmacies that dispense only prescription medications. 
 66. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (stating that “[t]he Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o 
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silent as to the Commerce Clause’s limits on state regulation, courts 
consistently interpret the Commerce Clause as having a negative, or 
“dormant,” sweep that limits state regulations that interfere with 
interstate commerce.67 This negative sweep is known as the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.68  
The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits state regulations in two 
ways. First, it prohibits state regulations that discriminate against 
interstate commerce. Such prohibited discrimination may be facially 
evident,69 or may be implied from discriminatory means70 or 
 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes”). 
 67. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 227 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) 
(containing the earliest suggestion of this negative aspect of the Commerce Clause: “[T]he grant 
of [commerce] power [to the federal government] carries with it the whole subject, leaving 
nothing for the State to act upon.”). 
 68. There are several principal justifications for interpreting the Commerce Clause as 
having an implied dormant aspect. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 
(1949). First, a historical argument suggests that the Framers, in adopting the Commerce 
Clause, necessarily intended that state laws interfering with interstate commerce could not 
stand. Id. at 533–34. Second, an economic justification asserts that prohibiting state regulation 
in the realm of interstate commerce promotes economic growth. Id. at 532–33. Third, a political 
argument suggests that citizens of one state should not be subject to potentially harmful 
regulations of another state in which they have no political representation. See ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 321 (1st ed. 2001) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 429–30 (1819)). 
 However, the Dormant Commerce Clause has also received harsh criticism. For example, 
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas has suggested that “[t]he negative Commerce Clause 
has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually 
unworkable in application.” Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 
564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 69. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). Baldwin involved 
a challenge to a New York regulation that prohibited a milk distributor from selling milk 
obtained out of state if the price of such milk was lower than the required price of in-state milk. 
Id. at 519. In holding the state regulation unconstitutional, the Supreme Court declared that the 
regulation violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because “the avowed purpose . . . [was] to 
suppress or mitigate the consequences of competition between the states.” Id. at 522. It can be 
assumed, by extending this holding, that any state regulation that facially discriminates against 
out-of-state competitors in an effort to prevent or discourage interstate competition will almost 
always be per se invalid. See also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 
392 (1994) (stating that “[d]iscrimination against interstate commerce in favor of local business 
or investment is per se invalid, save a narrow class of cases” (citations omitted)). 
 70. The Supreme Court has suggested that a state regulation may be impliedly 
discriminatory in means if it attempts to regulate activities occurring wholly outside of the 
state’s borders. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 
573, 585 (1986). The Court considered a challenge to a New York law that required “every 
liquor distiller or producer that [sold] liquor to wholesalers within [New York] to sell at a price 
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effects.71 If a court determines that a state regulation is discriminatory 
in nature, it will subject the regulation to stricter judicial review and 
the regulation will be found virtually per se invalid.72 Second, the 
Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits state regulations that, although 
nondiscriminatory in nature, impose an undue burden on interstate 
commerce.73 In determining the validity of such nondiscriminatory 
regulations, courts apply less stringent review by beginning with a 
presumption in favor of the statute.74  
Given these alternative prohibitions on state regulation, analysis 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause requires a two-pronged 
inquiry.75 First, one must ask whether the regulation is 
 
that [was] no higher than the lowest price the distiller charge[d] wholesalers anywhere else in 
the United States.” Id. at 575. The Court invalidated this law on the ground that New York 
impermissibly “project[ed] its legislation into [other States],” and therefore ran afoul of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 583 (quoting Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521). 
 Similarly, the Supreme Court has indicated that a regulation may also be impliedly 
discriminatory in means if it imposes burdens on out-of-state competitors, but fails to impose 
similar burdens on in-state competitors. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 
617, 628 (1978). In City of Philadelphia the Court considered a New Jersey law that prohibited 
the importation of waste for disposal in New Jersey landfills. Id. at 618. Although the Court 
recognized that the regulation may have been designed to serve legitimate state interests, it held 
that these interests could not be served “by discriminating against articles of commerce coming 
from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them 
differently.” Id. at 626–27.  
 71. The Supreme Court has also suggested that a regulation may be discriminatory in 
effect when it affects interstate commerce more severely than intrastate commerce. See, e.g., 
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350–52 (1977). In Hunt, a North 
Carolina statute prohibited containers of apples shipped into the state from displaying the 
shipping state’s grade, requiring instead that all containers display the United States grade. Id. 
at 335. The Court invalidated the statute, noting that the North Carolina regulation had “the 
practical effect of not only burdening interstate sales of [another state’s] apples, but also 
discriminating against them.” Id. at 350. 
 72. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, at 330. Chemerinsky notes that “if the Court 
concludes that a state is discriminating against out-of-staters, then there is a strong presumption 
against the law and it will be upheld only if it is necessary to achieve an important purpose.” Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (establishing that state 
regulations may be held invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause if the burdens imposed 
by the regulations on interstate commerce outweigh the local benefits to be gained from them). 
 74. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, at 330. “[I]f the Court concludes that the law is 
non-discriminatory, then the presumption is in favor of upholding the law, and it will be 
invalidated only if it is shown that the law’s burdens on interstate commerce outweigh its 
benefits.” Id. In analyzing these cases, the distinction between discriminatory and 
nondiscriminatory regulations is extremely blurry. It is often difficult to determine whether a 
particular regulation is to be subject to a higher or more relaxed standard of review.  
 75. See, e.g., Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n v. N.M. Bd. of Pharmacy, 525 P.2d 931, 935 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1974). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/28
p619 Vanderstappen book pages.doc  12/4/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006] Internet Pharmacies & the Dormant Commerce Clause 633 
 
 
discriminatory.76 If so, the regulation will be subject to meticulous 
judicial review and will be virtually per se invalid. Second, one must 
ask whether a nondiscriminatory regulation imposes an undue burden 
on interstate commerce.77 In such cases, courts must analyze the 
challenged regulation using the balancing approach mandated by the 
Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.78 The Pike balancing 
test requires courts to evaluate the validity of a regulation by 
weighing the incidental burdens imposed on interstate commerce 
against the local benefits to be gained.79 Only when the benefits 
gained exceed the burdens imposed will a state regulation be valid 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause.80  
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Internet 
To date, there has been no case law concerning the validity of 
state regulations of Internet pharmacies.81 However, there have been 
 
 76. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 318. 
 77. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 78. Id. Pike involved a challenge to an Arizona statute that required all cantaloupes grown 
in the state to be packaged and shipped in closed containers. Id. at 138. The Supreme Court held 
this statute unconstitutional on the ground that it imposed a significant burden on interstate 
commerce but provided very limited local benefit to the state of Arizona. Id. at 143–46. 
 However, in recent years, several Justices and commentators have objected to the Pike 
balancing approach, arguing instead that all nondiscriminatory state regulations should be 
upheld. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., 486 U.S. 888, 897–98 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). Justice Scalia argues that “[w]eighing the governmental interests of a State against 
the needs of interstate commerce is . . . a task squarely within the responsibility of Congress, 
and ill suited to the judicial function.” Id. at 898 (citations omitted); see also Donald H. Regan, 
The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1101–02 (1986). 
 79. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citations omitted). “Where the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce 
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Id. The Court further noted that “the extent 
of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest 
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate 
activities.” Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. However, there have been several cases that have analyzed state regulations of 
pharmacy activity more generally under the Dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., State v. 
Rasmussen, 213 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 1973); Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n v. N.M. Bd. of Pharmacy, 525 
P.2d 931 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974). These cases illustrate conflicting views as to whether state 
regulations that target pharmacies located out-of-state violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.  
 For example, in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Ass’n, the court considered a challenge to a 
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several cases concerning the validity of state regulations of Internet 
activity on a more general level,82 from which specific conclusions 
 
New Mexico statute that imposed regulations and a licensing fee on out-of-state pharmacists 
who distributed medications to in-state residents. 525 P.2d at 934. The challenged provision 
stated: 
No manufacturer shipping dangerous drugs into New Mexico or who sells or 
distributes dangerous drugs in this state through any person or media, other than a 
wholesaler who has obtained a license, shall conduct the business of selling or 
distributing dangerous drugs without obtaining an out-of-state drug license from the 
board.  
Id. The statute further required that out-of-state pharmacists pay a $100.00 licensing fee. Id. 
The court first found that the challenged provisions were not discriminatory in nature and thus 
did not represent a per se violation. Id. at 935. The court noted that at the time there were no 
drug manufacturers located within the state of New Mexico and therefore “only one class, out-
of-state manufacturers, [was] affected by the regulation . . . .” Id. The court further noted that 
“since all persons in that class [were] treated equally, there [was] no discrimination.” Id. The 
court also analyzed the challenged provisions under the Pike balancing test and concluded that 
the provisions were valid. Id. The court noted that the primary purpose of the provision was 
“the protection of the public from dangerous drugs” and that “[this] purpose [was] well within 
the traditional definition of police power.” Id. (citations omitted). However, the court conceded 
that the registration fee may have affected small manufacturers that sought to ship products into 
New Mexico. Id. Despite this, the court also noted that “the fee [was] not large and only the 
manufacturers and wholesale distributors, not salesmen, [were] required to pay it.” Id. As such, 
the court held that this “small burden [did] not outweigh the substantial state benefit derived 
from the control.” Id. 
 In Rasmussen, the court considered an Iowa provision that, as interpreted by both parties, 
“prohibit[ed] the filling by Iowa pharmacists of prescriptions written by nonresident physicians 
who are not registered by the Iowa authorities to prescribe controlled substances.” 213 N.W.2d 
at 663. However, the Rasmussen court interpreted the statute to also effectively prohibit Iowa 
pharmacists from filling prescriptions written by out-of-state unregistered physicians. Id. at 664. 
The court invalidated this provision on the narrow ground that the registration requirement 
conflicted with federal registration requirements and thus was preempted. Id. at 666. However, 
the court noted in dicta that the challenged provision would also run afoul of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause. Id. at 667–68. The court first noted that the statute “[did] not discriminate in 
its language between foreign practitioners and those registered in Iowa” and thus did not 
represent a per se violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 667. However, the court 
further noted that although it “[did] not question the right of a state to regulate for the health 
and safety of its citizens,” the “need for uniformity in registration for practitioners” outweighed 
Iowa’s interest. Therefore, the court held the provisions unconstitutional. Id. at 667–68 
(citations omitted). This suggestion resembles to the Pataki court’s argument that regulation of 
Internet pharmacies is necessarily a matter of federal, rather than state, concern. See infra note 
90 and accompanying text. For further discussion of these cases and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, see Clevenger, supra note 22, at 175–79; Fentiman, supra note 7, at 165–76. 
 82. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 264 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001); Am. 
Civil Liberties Union v. Johnson, 194 F. 3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999); PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 
167 F. Supp. 2d 878 (W.D. Va. 2001), aff’d, 362 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2004); Cyberspace 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Am. Libraries Ass’n v. 
Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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may be drawn regarding the validity of state regulations of Internet 
pharmacies.83 A review of the current case law in this area reflects a 
split of authority as to whether such regulations pose an 
impermissible burden on interstate commerce, thus violating the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.84  
The first line of cases suggests that state laws that regulate 
Internet activities necessarily violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
The preeminent case representing this line of reasoning is American 
Libraries Association v. Pataki.85 In Pataki, the court invalidated 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause a law that prohibited the 
communication of certain types of sexually offensive material via the 
Internet.86 The Pataki court invalidated the regulation using three 
alternative theories.87 First, the court found that the regulation was 
discriminatory in nature and thus represented a per se violation of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.88 Second, the court suggested that even 
if the regulation were not a per se violation, it would be invalid under 
 
 83. It may be argued that these cases involving the general regulation of Internet activities 
are not completely analogous and thus should not be dispositive of the fate of regulations 
specifically regarding Internet pharmacies. However, this debate is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
 84. See Clevenger, supra note 22, 175–76; Fentiman, supra note 7, at 172; Terry, supra 
note 4, 235–39. 
 85. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160.  
 86. Id. The Pataki court noted that Dormant Commerce Clause analysis was appropriate 
because of the “similarity between the Internet and more traditional instruments of interstate 
commerce.” Id. at 161. The court also noted that this analysis was proper given the Commerce 
Clause’s goal of preventing the “menace of inconsistent state regulation.” Id. at 169. The statute 
in question provides in pertinent part that it is a crime for any individual who: 
[k]nowing the character and content of the communication which, in whole or in part, 
depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, and 
which is harmful to minors, to intentionally use any computer communication system 
allowing the input, output, examination or transfer, of computer data or computer 
programs from one computer to another, to initiate or engage in such communication 
with a person who is a minor.  
Id. at 163 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21(2) (McKinney 2006)). 
 87. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169. It is unclear which of these three theories led to the 
invalidation of the challenged regulation in this case. It is thus likewise unclear which of these 
theoretical routes is merely dicta.  
 88. Id. at 173–77. The court noted that because “[t]he nature of the Internet makes it 
impossible to restrict the effects of the New York Act to conduct occurring within New York,” 
the challenged regulation impermissibly extended its reach by seeking to regulate conduct 
occurring wholly outside of the state’s borders. Id. at 177. As such, the act was discriminatory 
in means and per se invalid. Id.; see also supra note 70. 
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the Pike balancing test.89 Finally, and most importantly for purposes 
of this analysis, the court suggested that given the amorphous nature 
of the Internet, laws that regulate the Internet should fall within the 
sole realm of federal, rather than state, government.90 
Several other federal courts that have considered the issue of 
Internet regulation have followed Pataki’s reasoning.91 However, 
these cases differ as to which theory of Pataki was used to invalidate 
the regulations in question. For example, one court rested its holding 
on the fact that the state regulation impermissibly regulated out-of-
state conduct, and was thus discriminatory in nature.92 Another court, 
ambiguously and with hesitation, suggested that the current nature of 
the Internet prohibits any state regulation in this area.93 Finally, a 
 
 89. Id. at 177–81. In applying the Pike balancing test, the Pataki court posited that 
although the protection of children against exposure to objectionable sexual material via the 
Internet was a legitimate state interest, “[t]he local benefits likely to result from the New York 
Act are not overwhelming,” id. at 178, whereas the act posed an “extreme burden on interstate 
commerce,” id. at 179. For a discussion of the Pike balancing test, see supra notes 73–74, 78–
79 and accompanying text. 
 90. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 181–83. The court argued that “courts have long recognized 
that certain types of commerce demand consistent treatment and are therefore susceptible to 
regulation only on a national level” and that “[t]he Internet represents one of those areas.” Id. at 
181. The court further argued that a national regulatory scheme in regards to Internet activities 
would ensure “that users are reasonably able to determine their obligations.” Id. at 182. 
Alternatively, “[r]egulation on a local level . . . will leave users lost in a welter of inconsistent 
laws . . . .” Id.; see also State v. Rasmussen, 213 N.W.2d 661, 668 (Iowa 1973) (using a similar 
argument to invalidate a state regulation targeting pharmacy activities more generally). 
 91. See, e.g., ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d. 1149 (10th Cir. 1999); PSINet, Inc. v. 
Chapman, 167 F. Supp. 2d 878 (W.D. Va. 2001), aff’d, 362 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2004); 
Cyberspace Commc’ns, Inc. v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 2d 827, 830–31 (E.D. Mich. 2001).  
 92. Cyberspace, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 830–31. The Cyberspace court considered a Michigan 
statute that prohibited the communication of certain types of objectionable sexual materials to 
minors via the Internet. Id. at 830 (analyzing the statute described in Cyberspace 
Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 739–40 (E.D. Mich. 1999)). In granting 
the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the Cyberspace court noted, inter alia, that the 
regulation violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. 142 F. Supp. 2d at 831. Specifically, the 
court noted that the regulation “attempt[ed] to control Internet communications which might 
originate . . . in other states, or in other countries.” Id. at 830–31. Because the Dormant 
Commerce Clause forbids such an extraterritorial extension of state regulation, the law in 
question could not stand. Id. at 831. 
 93. PSINet, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 891. As in Cyberspace, the PSINet court was faced with a 
Virginia statute that prohibited the display or communication of sexually offensive material to 
minors. Id. at 882. The court seemingly invalidated the regulation because it “burden[ed] 
interstate commerce unduly by placing restrictions on electronic commercial materials in all 
states” and therefore violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 890–91 (emphasis added). 
However, the PSINet court also suggested that it may support the Pataki court’s view that 
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third court applied all three Pataki theories.94 These differences 
highlight the difficultly that Pataki poses in terms of precedential 
value.95  
The second line of cases suggests that state regulations of Internet 
activities do not necessarily violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
The preeminent case representing this line of reasoning is Ford 
Motor Company v. Texas Department of Transportation.96 The Ford 
court upheld a state law that had been applied so as to prohibit the 
operation of an Internet website.97 Although the court upheld the 
regulation under the Pike balancing test,98 the court also explicitly 
disapproved of the Pataki court’s blanket invalidation of all state 
regulations of Internet activity.99 
 
Internet activities are uniquely within the regulatory realm of the federal government, and as 
such all state regulations thereof must be invalid. Id. at 891. The PSINet court specifically noted 
that the current nature of the Internet makes it “technologically infeasible for a Web site [sic] 
operator to limit access to online materials by geographic location.” Id. However, by explicitly 
referring to the “current status of geographic filtering technology,” id. at 891 (emphasis added), 
the court exhibited a reluctance to permanently foreclose all state regulations in this realm, 
arguably suggesting that with future technological advancements, such regulations may be 
permissible. 
 94. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1160–61. 
 95. For a discussion of the precedential difficulties posed by the Pataki holding, see supra 
note 87. 
 96. 264 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001).  
 97. The regulation at issue in Ford did not specifically target Internet activity. Instead, the 
regulation swept more broadly by prohibiting an automobile manufacturer or distributor from 
engaging in activities of or acting as a dealer without a license. Id. at 498. Ford Motor Company 
sold pre-owned vehicles via an Internet site maintained and operated by Ford. Id. However, the 
state of Texas alleged that this practice violated the above-mentioned statute. Id. In response, 
Ford maintained that this state regulation violated the Dormant Commerce Clause and thus was 
invalid. Id. 
 98. Ford, 264 F.3d at 503–04. The court first considered whether the challenged 
regulation was discriminatory in nature. Id. at 499–502. After determining that the challenged 
regulation was nondiscriminatory, the court analyzed the regulation under the Pike balancing 
test. Id. at 503–04. The court upheld the regulation under this test and noted that “Ford ha[d] 
failed to establish that the burden [on interstate commerce was] clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative local benefits.” Id. at 503. 
 99. Id. at 505. The Ford court accepted the Pataki court’s argument for uniformity in 
regulation. Id. However, the court countered this assertion by noting that “application of this 
principle in circumstances like the instant case would lead to absurd results. It would allow 
corporations or individuals to circumvent otherwise constitutional state laws and regulations 
simply by connecting the transaction to the internet.” Id. 
 The decision of the lower court in this case also contains an emphatic rejection of the 
Pataki reasoning. Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 905, 909 (W.D. 
Tex. 2000). Specifically, the court noted that it would be illogical to hold, as Pataki suggests, 
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V. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
A. Pataki’s Bright Line Invalidation of All State Regulations of the 
Internet 
This Note rejects at the outset the Pataki court’s100 suggestion that 
regulation of the Internet falls solely under the authority of the 
federal government and therefore any state regulation in this area 
must necessarily fail.101 This suggestion cannot be dispositive of 
future cases for several reasons. First, in addition to a blanket 
invalidation of all state regulations of the Internet, the Pataki court 
also suggested two additional theories upon which to invalidate the 
challenged regulation.102 It is unclear upon which of these three 
justifications the Pataki holding is based, and thus equally unclear 
which of these theoretical justifications are merely dicta. This 
problem may best be exemplified by the difficulty experienced by 
subsequent courts that have attempted to follow Pataki’s holding.103 
Several courts have ostensibly followed the Pataki holding, but have 
vastly differed as to which of the three alternate Pataki theories was 
appropriate. Indeed, only one such court adopted Pataki’s blanket 
invalidation alone to invalidate a challenged regulation, and it did so 
with noticeable hesitation.104 Given these precedential concerns, the 
blanket justification proposed by Pataki cannot be dispositive of 
future cases. 
 
that “an activity which is appropriately regulated when accomplished through any other 
medium becomes sacrosanct when accomplished through the internet.” Id. The court cautioned 
that if the Pataki court’s reasoning were accepted, “all state regulatory schemes would fall 
before the mighty altar of the internet,” a consequence which surely could not have been 
intended by the creation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. Id. However, unlike the regulation 
in Pataki, the regulation in Ford was not directed solely at Internet activities but was merely 
applied as such in the particular case at hand. See supra note 97. With this distinction in mind, 
it is unclear how the Fifth Circuit would analyze a similar regulation directed exclusively at 
Internet activities.  
 100. Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 101. For a detailed discussion of the Pataki holding, see supra Part IV.B and notes 85–90.  
 102. The Pataki court also suggested that the challenged regulation may by invalid by 
acting to discriminate against out-of-state competitors, or by imposing an undue burden on 
interstate commerce in violation of the Pike balancing test. See supra notes 88–89.  
 103. For a list of cases that have followed the Pataki holding, see supra note 91. 
 104. PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 167 F. Supp. 2d 878, 891 (W.D. Va. 2001), aff’d, 362 F.3d 
227 (4th Cir. 2004); see also supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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Moreover, the Pataki court’s underlying assumption is necessarily 
flawed in several respects and thus is shaky ground upon which to 
invalidate all state regulations of Internet activity. The Pataki court 
rested its blanket invalidation in part on the fact that the amorphous 
nature of the Internet inextricably links it to interstate commerce, and 
thus requires the oversight of the federal government pursuant to its 
Commerce Clause powers.105 As the Ford court recognized, although 
the Pataki court’s premise that the nature of the Internet necessarily 
implicates interstate commerce may be valid, it does not support the 
blanket invalidation of all state regulations in this area.106 
The appropriate analysis under the Dormant Commerce Clause is 
not simply whether the state regulation affects interstate 
commerce.107 Instead, Dormant Commerce Clause analysis requires a 
two-pronged inquiry: first, whether the challenged regulation 
discriminates against out-of-state commerce; and second, whether or 
not the challenged regulation poses an undue burden on interstate 
commerce.108 By imposing a blanket invalidation on all state 
regulations of Internet activity without a showing that they are either 
discriminatory or unduly burdensome on interstate commerce, the 
Pataki court ignored and effectively eviscerated decades of Dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
In addition, the blanket invalidation of all state regulations of the 
Internet would contravene fundamental principles of federalism, 
which the FDA itself has traditionally respected.109 The vast nature of 
the Internet allows it to reach into all aspects of life, such that 
 
 105. See supra note 90. The Pataki court noted that the Internet exhibits a “chaotic, random 
structure” such that it is uniquely immune from effective organization or control by a unified 
body. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 164. The Pataki court further noted that “[o]nce a provider posts 
content on the Internet, it is available to all other Internet users worldwide.” Id. at 167 (citations 
omitted). Therefore, a user who posts information on the Internet has “no way of knowing the 
location of the recipient of his or her communication.” Id. Given this geographically amorphous 
nature, the Pataki court held that traditional geographical limits on state regulation could not be 
meaningfully applied to Internet regulations, and thus attempted state regulations must 
necessarily fail. Id. at 168–73. 
 106. For a discussion of the decision in Ford and the court’s rejection of Pataki’s 
underlying assumption, see supra note 99. 
 107. See supra Part IV.A. 
 108. See supra Part IV.A. 
 109. Generally, states retain regulatory authority over police power matters, that is, those 
matters which concern the public health and welfare. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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virtually every activity will in some way be connected to the Internet. 
Therefore, if the Pataki court’s theory is accepted, a state could easily 
and unjustifiably be robbed of virtually all of its traditional regulatory 
authority over police power matters simply because the activities are 
in some way intertwined with or carried out via the Internet. For 
example, the regulation of pharmacists and pharmacies has 
traditionally fallen under states’ police power authority over matters 
affecting public health and welfare.110 Allowing the federal 
government to assume regulatory power when the pharmacy happens 
to conduct business over the Internet represents an unjustified 
intrusion into the traditional regulatory rights of the states. This is a 
result that surely cannot be supported. 
Finally, state participation and regulation is vital to the effective 
control of Internet pharmacies.111 The problems posed by Internet 
pharmacies are massive and sweeping in nature. Consequently, it is 
simply unreasonable to presume that the already overworked and 
understaffed FDA can effectively tackle this problem without the 
assistance of individual states. For example, it is clear that states have 
thus far been the driving force behind implementing new and 
experimental regulations and initiating successful disciplinary actions 
against unsafe pharmacies.112 States should continue to play an 
indispensable role in attacking the problems associated with 
illegitimate Internet pharmacies.   
B. Analysis of Representative State Regulations 
Given the rejection of the Pataki court’s per se invalidation, it is 
necessary to analyze the validity of representative state regulations 
under the traditional two-pronged Dormant Commerce Clause 
inquiry.113 
 
 110. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 111. States are responsible for bringing enforcement and disciplinary actions against 
Internet pharmacies. See supra notes 35, 53. 
 112. For examples, see supra note 35. 
 113. Dormant Commerce Clause cases must be evaluated under a two-pronged test: first, 
whether the regulation acts in a discriminatory manner; and second, whether the regulation 
imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce. See supra Part IV.A and accompanying 
notes. 
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1. Nevada Statute 
Of the three representative statutes,114 the Nevada statute most 
easily passes muster under this inquiry and would likely satisfy the 
requirements of the Dormant Commerce Clause. The Nevada statute 
requires that all Internet pharmacies that supply medication to 
Nevada residents be licensed with the state of Nevada.115 These 
requirements apply equally to both in-state and out-of-state Internet 
pharmacies and do not regulate extraterritorially because they limit 
their reach only to transactions that involve Nevada residents. 
Therefore, the Nevada statute is likely nondiscriminatory, and thus 
passes the first prong of the Dormant Commerce Clause inquiry.  
The Nevada statute will also likely survive the second prong of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause inquiry, the Pike balancing test. The 
Nevada statute provides immense local benefits by protecting the 
public health and welfare from unscrupulous Internet pharmacists and 
unsafe prescription medications. In contrast, the Nevada statute 
imposes only a minor burden on interstate commerce by simply 
requiring that Internet pharmacists obtain a Nevada license prior to 
doing business in the state. It is likely that this small burden on 
interstate commerce will be outweighed by the immense local 
benefits to be gained, and thus the Nevada statute would also pass the 
second prong of the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.  
2. New York Statute 
In contrast, the New York statute is somewhat more problematic 
and thus may not pass the two-pronged Dormant Commerce Clause 
inquiry as written. The New York statute requires inter alia that out-
of-state Internet pharmacies be licensed with their home state, 
maintain available records of shipments to New York residents, and 
maintain a toll-free number where a pharmacist can be reached.116 
However, the New York requirements apply only to out-of-state 
 
 114. See infra Part III.B. 
 115. NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.3638 (2005); see also supra notes 61–62 and accompanying 
text. 
 116. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 63.8 (2003); see also supra note 64. 
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pharmacies. It is therefore arguable that the statute operates in a 
facially discriminatory manner with the goal of deterring out-of-state 
business. Similarly, there is no language in the New York statute that 
limits its application to only those pharmacists who conduct business 
within the state of New York; therefore the statute also arguably 
regulates extraterritorially. Given these two problems, the New York 
statute may be found discriminatory and thus per se invalid. It is 
unclear whether the New York statute would pass even the first prong 
of Dormant Commerce Clause inquiry. 
If these concerns are insufficient to cause the statute to be held 
discriminatory and thus per se invalid, the New York statute would 
likely pass muster under the second prong’s Pike balancing test. As 
above, the statute provides immense local benefits by protecting New 
York residents from unsafe medications. At the same time, the 
burdens imposed are very few. Indeed, by merely requiring the 
Internet pharmacy to be licensed in its home state, the New York 
statute arguably requires no more from the Internet pharmacy 
wishing to do business in New York than it would otherwise be 
required to do if it were to limit its business to its home state. As 
such, it is likely that the New York statute would survive the Pike 
balancing test. 
3. California Statute 
The California statute is also problematic and therefore may be 
held invalid as written under current Dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence. The California statute requires that all Internet 
pharmacists establish that there has been a good faith physical 
examination by a physician prior to supplying any medication to a 
California resident.117 Like the Nevada statute, the requirements of 
the California statute apply equally to both in-state and out-of-state 
Internet pharmacies. Likewise, the California statute imposes 
requirements only upon those pharmacies that conduct business with 
California residents, and therefore it does not attempt to 
impermissibly extend its reach extraterritorially. Given this, the 
California statute on its face operates in a nondiscriminatory fashion 
 
 117. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4067 (West 2003); see also supra note 58. 
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and therefore would likely pass the first prong of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause inquiry.  
In contrast, it is unclear whether the California statute would pass 
the second prong’s Pike balancing test. As above, the statute 
potentially provides immense local benefits by protecting California 
residents from unsafe prescription medications. However, the 
California statute also requires that the pharmacist inquire as to a 
prior good faith physical examination before completing any 
transaction via the Internet. In practice, this requirement, although 
perhaps useful, imposes an extremely onerous burden on Internet 
pharmacies by requiring that a pharmacist or another employee 
contact the prescribing physician to verify the validity of the 
prescription for each transaction. This requirement is even more 
daunting for the Internet pharmacy that is located out-of-state or 
perhaps even out of the country. The necessary effect of such a 
requirement would be to discourage Internet pharmacies from doing 
business in California. As such, the California statute arguably poses 
an undue burden on interstate commerce. It therefore possibly fails 
the Pike balancing test.  
C. Proposal 
Future courts should follow the Ford court in rejecting Pataki’s 
blanket invalidation of all state regulations of Internet pharmacies. 
Instead, courts should analyze challenged regulations under the 
traditional two-pronged Dormant Commerce Clause inquiry. First, 
courts should consider whether the challenged regulations operate 
discriminatorily. If so, the regulation should be found per se invalid. 
If not, the court should apply the Pike balancing test to evaluate the 
benefits to be gained from the regulation in comparison with the 
burdens that the regulation will impose on interstate commerce. If the 
burden imposed on interstate commerce outweighs the benefits to be 
gained, the regulation should likewise be held invalid.  
Because the Dormant Commerce Clause does not necessarily 
foreclose the possibility of state regulations of Internet pharmacies, 
states should be encouraged to adopt regulations that best alleviate 
the concerns posed by these entities. However, states should keep the 
restrictions of the Dormant Commerce Clause in mind when adopting 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p619 Vanderstappen book pages.doc  12/4/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
644 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 22:619 
 
 
such regulations. Additionally, several current state regulations may 
run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause as written and thus 
should be revised.118  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Internet pharmacies may potentially provide a viable solution to 
the current health care crisis. However, these entities are not without 
fault, and they pose numerous dangers to the public health and 
welfare. In response, many states have adopted regulations that 
oversee and control the activities of these pharmacies. However, 
these regulations, like all state regulations, must not exceed the 
constraints of the Dormant Commerce Clause. Although courts have 
not yet had occasion to consider the validity of state regulations of 
Internet pharmacies, as more states adopt and attempt to apply such 
regulations, it is only a matter of time before they come under attack 
on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds. 
In response to analogous challenges against more general Internet 
regulations, courts have taken various approaches. Several courts 
have invalidated such regulations. Most controversially, some have 
invalidated the regulation in question on the grounds that because of 
the amorphous nature of the Internet, regulations thereof fall under 
the sole regulatory authority of federal, rather than state, government. 
Such courts take the position that state regulations of the Internet 
must necessarily be invalidated for this reason. This Note has 
demonstrated that this argument is flawed and thus should be rejected 
by future courts. Instead, state regulations of Internet pharmacies 
should continue to be evaluated under the traditional Dormant 
Commerce Clause two-pronged inquiry. 
 
 118. See supra Part V.B. 
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